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We use a spatial model to investigate a state’s choice of branch banking and 
interstate banking regimes as a function of the regime choices made by other 
states and other variables suggested in the literature.  We extend the basic spatial 
econometric model by allowing spatial dependence to vary by geographic region.  
Our findings reveal that spatial effects have a large, statistically significant 
impact on state regulatory regime decisions. The importance of spatial 
correlation in the setting of state banking policies suggests the need to consider 
spatial effects in empirical models of state policies in general.   
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I.  Introduction 
The U.S. banking industry has consolidated rapidly over the past two decades.  From a 
postwar peak of 14,496 banks in 1984, the number of U.S. commercial banks had fallen to 
7,789 banks at the end of 2003.  Over the same period, the average size of banks, measured in 
terms of total assets, increased from $307 million in 1984 (in 2003 dollars) to $979 million in 
2003.   
The consolidation and increased average size of U.S. banks has coincided with a 
substantial relaxation of geographic restrictions on the location of bank branches and bank 
holding company subsidiaries (Rhoades, 2000).  The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 eliminated federal restrictions on interstate banking and 
branching by U.S. commercial banks.
1  The legislation also eliminated most of the remaining 
state barriers to interstate banking and came after many states had already relaxed their 
restrictions on branching within their borders.  In 1970, only twelve U.S. states permitted 
statewide branching, and none allowed entry by bank holding companies headquartered in other 
states.
2  By 1994, all states except Iowa permitted statewide branching through the acquisition 
of existing bank offices, and many permitted branching through the establishment of entirely 
new offices.  Also by 1994, all states except Hawaii permitted some entry by out-of-state 
holding companies.  Whereas less than half of all U.S. commercial banks operated any branch 
offices in 1984, 71 percent of banks had multiple offices in 2003. 
                                                      
1   Interstate banking refers to the location of bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies in different states.  
Interstate branching refers to the location of bank branches in different states. 
2   When states enacted laws prohibiting entry by out-of state holding companies, they typically did not force out-
of-state holding companies to give up their existing banks. 
  1The removal of geographic restrictions on banks and consolidation of the industry has 
prompted numerous concerns about the conduct and performance of commercial banks in a less 
regulated environment.  For example, because small firms tend to borrow disproportionately 
from small banks, researchers have examined the effects of banking industry consolidation and 
increasing average bank size on the cost and availability of credit for small businesses.  
Although the evidence has been mixed, Petersen and Rajan (2002) conclude that despite 
consolidation, the market for small business loans has become more competitive and small 
firms have more access to credit today than in the past.  They argue that advances in computing 
and communications technology have increased the availability of quantifiable information 
about potential borrowers and reduced the importance of “soft” information in small business 
lending.  Thus, close proximity between borrowers and lenders is now less important than in the 
past.
3  More broadly, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) contend that branching deregulation has 
encouraged more efficient allocation of bank capital and increased economic growth.  They 
estimate that the removal of state-level barriers to branching increased state per capita income 
growth rates by an average of 0.50−1.00 percentage points.
4   
Petersen and Rajan (2002) argue that advances in information-processing technology 
have reduced incentives to maintain geographic restrictions on bank branching by enabling 
successful penetration of local banking markets by outside lenders.  Kroszner and Strahan 
(1999) contend that in addition to technological advances in information processing and 
communications, financial innovations such as cash management accounts, money market 
                                                      
3   Stein (2002) presents a model in which small banks have comparative advantages in making loans that are based 
on “soft” information, e.g., “character” loans, which are more typical of small business loans.  Such information is 
more difficult to quantify and manage in large, geographically disperse banking organizations.  See Avery and 
Samolyk (2004) for evidence on the evolving role of small banks in consolidating banking markets, and Berger et 
al. (2004) for a recent survey of the literature on bank concentration and competition. 
4  Freeman (2002) argues that because states tended to deregulate after prolonged periods of slow growth, Jayaratne 
and Strahan (1999) overestimate the positive impact of deregulation on growth.   
  2mutual funds, and the development of national markets for residential mortgages and other 
types of bank loans encouraged the elimination of branching restrictions.  The pattern and 
timing of deregulation varied across states, Kroszner and Strahan (1999) argue, because of 
differences in the relative power of interest groups that benefited from the status quo versus 
those that would benefit from expanded geographic powers for banks.
5  Historically, banks 
located in small communities and rural areas lobbied against legislation to permit branch 
banking, whereas large city banks generally favored branching.  Consumers of banking services 
were often similarly divided.  Farming and other small town interests often opposed branch 
banking, hoping to ensure that their local banks would continue to supply credit during 
economic downturns (see, e.g., Calomiris, 1992).  Other consumers of banking services favored 
branching, however, desiring more convenient and stable banking systems.
6 
In addition to the influence of interest groups, we believe that a state’s decision to adopt 
a particular bank regulatory regime may have been influenced by the decisions made by other 
states.  Several studies have noted regional differences in state banking laws.  For example, 
states in the Midwest and South historically had the most restrictive branching laws, likely 
reflecting a relatively strong influence of small banks and rural interests on state legislatures.  
Such states also were among the last to deregulate.
7  The first form of interstate banking 
deregulation consisted of regional compacts that permitted holding companies headquartered in 
one member state to locate subsidiary banks in the other member states.  Almost by definition, 
                                                      
5  See also Kane (1996). 
6   Historically, larger branching banks have fared better during banking crises.  An earlier wave of branching 
deregulation occurred during the Great Depression.  Abrams and Settle (1993) find that deregulation in that era was 
more likely to occur where interests favorable to branching had relatively more political strength, and in states that 
experienced higher bank failure rates, which were more numerous among small, unit banks than among large, 
branching banks. 
7   On the historical differences in bank regulation across states, see White (1983). 
  3one state’s decision to enter such a compact was dependent on the decisions of other member 
states.   
A state’s decision to adopt a new branching regime within its borders might also have 
been influenced by the branching regulations adopted by its neighbors.  Kroszner and Strahan 
(1999) argue that the possibility of participating in a regional compact could have influenced a 
state’s decision to permit intrastate branching because states typically relaxed branching 
restrictions before entering compacts.  Moreover, states could have been influenced by the 
effects of deregulation on banking markets, access to banking services, or economic growth in 
neighboring states that deregulated first.
8 
While anecdotal evidence suggests the possibility of interstate dependence in state 
branching and interstate banking policies, prior studies have not tested explicitly for spatial 
patterns or dependence in the choice of regulatory regime.  Strong evidence of spatial 
dependence has been found in the analysis of other state policies, however, such as lotteries 
(Alm et al., 1993; Garrett and Marsh 2002), budgeted expenditures (Case et al., 1993), and tax 
rates (Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; Hernandez, 2003).   
In this paper, we test for spatial dependence on bank regulatory decisions by 
incorporating spatial effects directly into an empirical model of regime choice.  Specifically, we 
estimate probit models of the choices between permitting state-wide branch banking (“intrastate 
branching”) or not, and of permitting entry by out-of-state bank holding companies (“interstate 
banking”) or not.  The spatial probit model is a flexible and established framework for relaxing 
                                                      
8   The experiences of nearby states might have more influence on a state’s decisions because similar employment 
patterns or industries might make the experiences of nearby states seem more relevant than those of distant states, 
or simply because rivalries are stronger among nearby states. 
  4the assumption of cross-sectional independence.
9  Further, our model allows spatial dependence 
to vary across geographic regions.  We find strong evidence that a state’s choice of regulatory 
regime was influenced by the decisions made by other states, but considerable variation exists 
in the size of this influence across regions.
10  Further, we find that certain results others have 
obtained about the determinants of deregulation are not robust to the inclusion of spatial effects 
in our model.  For example, in contrast to Kroszner and Strahan (1999), we find no evidence 
that the size of a state’s small business sector affected the choice of banking regime, and only 
weak evidence of a relationship between state branching or interstate banking policies and state 
regulation of insurance sales by banks.  That said, however, our results strongly support the 
widely held view that a state was less likely to adopt a liberal branching regime when its 
banking system was dominated by small banks. 
II.  Hypotheses About the Choice of Regulatory Regime 
In their empirical study of the removal of state branching restrictions, Kroszner and 
Strahan (1999) test various hypotheses associated with private-interest, public-interest, and 
political-institutional models of regulation.  We include many of their variables in our model of 
regime choice.  In addition, we examine the influence of spatial effects on regime choice and 
include an expanded set of variables to capture the influence of partisan politics on the 
regulatory decision. 
                                                      
9   By contrast, spatial interdependencies cannot be modeled adequately with a hazard model because in the hazard 
model, observations on individual states are no longer influential once the event of interest (e.g., deregulation) has 
occurred.  The hazard model also ignores the possibility that a state could change regime more than once.    
Although no state tightened its branching laws during the period we study, some states have done so historically 
(see, e.g., White, 1983).  On the other hand, discrete choice models, such as the probit, cannot make use of 
information about the timing of events as well as the hazard model. 
10   Although spatial discrete choice models, such as the spatial probit model, have had several applications in the 
literature (e.g., Case, 1992; Marsh et al., 2000; Murdoch et al., 2003), we are aware of one prior study (Marsh et al., 
2000) that tested for regional differences in patterns of spatial autocorrelation.  
  5Patterns of state deregulation of intrastate branching and interstate banking are 
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.  Twelve states located primarily on the West Coast, 
New England, and the Carolinas permitted statewide branching before 1970.
11  Beginning in 
1970, deregulation spread westward, beginning in the Northeast, then moving to the South, and 
finally to the Midwest and Great Plains.  The opening of states to interstate banking followed a 
similar pattern, with states in the East and Far West generally deregulating before those in the 
Midwest and Plains.  While these spatial patterns do not necessarily indicate that state decisions 
about banking regulations were interdependent, they are suggestive of the need for further 
study.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 prohibited interstate banking except in states 
that explicitly permitted the acquisition of their state banks by out-of-state holding companies.  
No state enacted such legislation until 1975, when Maine became the first state to permit out-of-
state holding companies to acquire its banks.  Other states gradually followed suit, often 
enacting laws that required reciprocity from states whose holding companies wished to enter 
their markets.  Regional compacts were established in New England and the Southeast in which 
each member state permitted entry by holding companies based in any other member state.  
Elsewhere, individual states enacted laws that permitted entry by holding companies 
headquartered in contiguous states, usually with reciprocity.
12   
Agreements between nearby states to allow entry by each other’s holding companies are 
suggestive of spatial dependence in the choice of interstate banking regime.  Spatial dependence 
                                                      
11   Other states permitted limited branching within market areas, contiguous counties, etc., or prohibited branching 
altogether.  See Spong (1994). 
  6in the choice of intrastate branching regime is suggested by the fact that states often relaxed 
their restrictions on intrastate branching as a precursor to entering interstate banking agreements 
with other states.  It is further suggested by evidence reported in Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) 
that deregulation had a large impact on the performance of banks and state economies.
13  Such 
dramatic effects probably would not have gone unnoticed in other states.  
Whereas Kroszner and Strahan (1999) point to advances in communications and 
information processing technology and financial innovation as the fundamental reasons why 
geographic restrictions on banks were relaxed beginning in the 1970s, they find that differences 
in the relative power of interest groups, as well as political-institutional differences, explain 
differences in the timing of deregulation across states.  We include the variables that  
Kroszner and Strahan (1999) find to be important determinants of the timing of deregulation in 
our empirical model of regime choice. 
The relative political influence of small and large banks has often been cited as an 
important determinant of a state’s choice of branch banking regulations.  Traditionally, small 
banks located in small markets favored restrictive branching laws, presumably to limit 
competition from large, urban banks.  Following Kroszner and Strahan (1999), we include the 
fraction of a state’s banking assets controlled by banks smaller than the state median to test this 
hypothesis.  We also include the difference between the average capital-to-asset ratios of small 
and large banks to test whether the relative financial strength of small banks influenced state 
regulatory decisions, where “small” and “large” are determined relative to the median bank in 
terms of total assets.  A state with financially weak small banks might have viewed the adoption 
                                                                                                                                                                         
12   See Spong (1994).   
13   Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) argue that deregulation enabled better performing banks to grow faster than 
weaker banks, which caused average operating costs and loan losses to decline sharply.  They also estimate that 
state per capita income growth increased by as much as 33 percent after a state eliminated its restrictions on branch 
  7of liberal branching or interstate banking rules as ways of increasing the supply of credit, and 
weak banks might not have had the resources to fight such changes in regulation.  
Kroszner and Strahan (1999) argue that rivalry between banks and insurance companies 
also affected the timing of branching deregulation.  Hence, we include an indicator variable for 
whether or not a state permits banks to sell insurance under the hypothesis that insurance 
companies have a stronger incentive to oppose relaxation of branching laws in states that permit 
banks to sell insurance.  We also include the ratio of total insurance sector assets to the sum of 
insurance and banking assets within a state to test the hypothesis that a relatively large 
insurance sector made the adoption of liberal branching and interstate banking laws less likely. 
We also follow Kroszner and Strahan (1999) and test whether the relative size of a 
state’s small business sector was an important determinant of regime choice.  Although small 
firms might view small banks as a more reliable source of credit than large banks, branching 
deregulation also tends to reduce local market power to the benefit of bank customers.  Like 
Kroszner and Strahan (1999), we construct this variable as the ratio of firms with less than 20 
employees to the total number of all firms in a state. 
We also include state real per capita income and the federal funds interest rate in our 
model to capture other possible bank customer-related influences on the choice of regulatory 
regime.  Presumably, the demand for banking services is positively associated with income 
levels. Thus, the consumers of banking services might have more incentive to press state 
governments for efficient banking markets in higher income states.  Also, income may proxy for 
                                                                                                                                                                         
banking.  See Freeman (2002), however, for evidence suggesting that deregulation had a much smaller impact on 
state growth rates. 
  8business cycle effects.  We include the federal funds rate to control for the possible influence of 
the level of market interest rates on banking markets and, thus, regime choice.
14 
Finally, we include variables to test whether the regulatory regime was affected by the 
political party affiliation of state legislatures or governor.  We include dummy variables for the 
party affiliation of the state governor and whether the same party controlled both houses of a 
state’s legislature.  One legislature dummy is set equal to ‘1’ if both houses have a Democratic 
Party majority, and equal to ‘0’ if not, and the other dummy is set equal to ‘1’ if both houses 
have Republican majority, and to ‘0’ if not.
15   
III.  Data and Empirical Model   
We use data on the 48 contiguous states in our empirical models of the determinants of 
intrastate branching and interstate banking regime during the 28-year period 1970 to 1997.  The 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 took full effect in 1997.
16  Under this 
act, bank holding companies are permitted to acquire banks in any state, merge banks across 
state lines and operate the merged banks as branches.  Although state restrictions on intrastate 
branching remained, we end our study in 1997 because the change in federal law governing 
interstate banking operations introduced a substantially new regime.  
Table 1 lists the years in which each state first permitted intrastate branching and 
interstate banking.  For states that adopted intrastate branching or interstate banking between 
1970 and 1997, our dependent variables are set to “1” in the year of adoption and all subsequent 
                                                      
14   Kroszner and Strahan (1999) include the average yield on bank loans in the state minus the federal funds rate as 
an independent variable in one specification to test the hypothesis that pressure for deregulation might be more 
intense in states where interest rates on bank loans were relatively high.  The coefficient on this variable is not 
significant or large in their model, however, and the data needed to construct it are not available over the entire 
sample period.  Hence, we do not include it here. 
15   We set the dummy variables for party control of the state legislature equal to ‘0’ for Nebraska, which has a 
unicameral legislature.  Our choice of variables to capture political influence differs from those specified by 
Kroszner and Strahan (1999).  They specify two variables:  i) a dummy set equal to ‘1’ if the same party controls 
  9years of our sample period.  We report descriptive statistics and data source information for all 
independent variables in Table 2. 
[Table 1 about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
Empirical Model – The Spatial Probit 
The basic model of spatial correlation developed by Cliff and Ord (1981) and Anselin 
(1988) allows for spatial dependence in the dependent variable (termed a ‘spatial lag’ or ‘spatial 
autoregression’) or in the error component (termed a ‘spatial error lag’ or ‘spatial 
autocorrelation’).  The dependent variable and the error terms are correlated across space in a 
consistent manner.  Spatial correlation in cross-sectional data is multi-dimensional in that it 
depends upon all contiguous or influential units of observation (in this case states).  Just as one 
corrects for autocorrelation in time series analysis, accurate cross-sectional analysis requires 
correcting for spatial autocorrelation.  Ignoring spatial dependence in the dependent variable can 
result in biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates, and a failure to control for spatial 
autocorrelation can result in inefficient coefficient estimates (see Anselin, 1988).    
The framework we adopt is similar to the standard spatial econometric model, although 
our specification is modified in the spirit of Case (1992) and Marsh et al. (2000) to account for 
the discrete nature of our dependent variable and the panel structure of the data.  Maximum 
likelihood estimation traditionally produces consistent estimates of spatial models with 
continuous dependent variables.  However, unless corrected for, spatial correlation in probit 
models introduces heteroskedasticity (Case, 1992; Marsh et al., 2000). 
                                                                                                                                                                         
the governor’s office and has majorities in both legislative chambers, and ii) the fraction of the three bodies 
(governorship, house of representatives, and senate) controlled by Democrats. 
16 The Act permitted interstate acquisitions by bank holding companies in 1995.   
  10The regime status for a state is derived, as in the usual binary choice model, from a 
latent variable y
* and the rule y
 = 1 if y
* > 0 and y = 0 if y
* ≤ 0.  Our first-order spatial lag probit 
model can be expressed as: 
(1)         yW y X
** = ⋅ ⋅ + + ρ β ε 
where X is a (TN×K) matrix of exogenous variables, and ε is a (TN×1) vector of i.i.d. error 
terms. W is a (TN×TN) block diagonal matrix having (N×N) spatial weights matrix w along T 
block diagonal elements.  Individual elements of w = {ωij}.  The scalar ρ is the spatial lag 
coefficient and reflects positive spatial correlation in the dependent variable if ρ > 0, negative 
spatial correlation if ρ < 0, and no spatial correlation if ρ = 0.
17  The estimated ρ can be 
interpreted as follows:  For any state i, an increase/decrease in the average of others states’ 
spatially weighted regime choice (Wy
*) results in an increased/decreased probability that state i 
will deregulate.  Performing OLS on (1) will result in biased and inconsistent coefficients 
because corr[Wy
*, ε] ≠ 0, and a failure to account for the spatial lag in (1) if ρ ≠ 0 will bias the 
elements of β (via omitted variable bias).
18 
Spatial correlation can also occur in the error term, ε.  Spatially correlated errors may 
occur due to spatial correlation among the independent variables, spatial heterogeneity in 
functional form, omitted variables, or spatial correlation in the dependent variable when a 
spatially lagged dependent variable is not included in the model (Anselin, 1988; chapter 8).  The 
first-order spatial error lag model is given as: 
(2)          ε λ ε υ λ υ = + = −
− WI W ()
1  
                                                      
17  Unlike the standard first-order autoregressive model in time series, the spatial correlation coefficients do not 
necessarily have to lie between –1 and 1 in the first-order spatial autoregressive model.  Generally, when a binary 
weights matrix is used the values for the spatial correlation coefficients are between the inverse of the largest and 
smallest eigenvalues of the weights matrix.  See Anselin (1995). 
18 See Anselin (1988, page 58). 
  11where ε is the (TN×1) vector of error terms, υ is a (TN×1) component of the error terms made 
up of i.i.d. random variables, W is the (TN×TN) matrix described earlier, and λ is a scalar that 
measures spatial error correlation.  The errors are positively correlated if λ > 0, negatively 
correlated if λ < 0, and not correlated if λ = 0.  As with autocorrelation in time series, a failure 
to account for spatial error correlation when λ ≠ 0 will render the parameter estimates inefficient 
because of the non-diagonal structure of the error covariance matrix.
19 
Many alternative weighting schemes for w have been used in the literature.  Perhaps the 
most common is the binary joins matrix (Cliff and Ord, 1981; Anselin, 1988; Case, 1992) in 
which ωij =1 if observations i and j (i≠j) share a common border, and ωij = 0 otherwise.  In this 
specification, the elements of matrix w are row-standardized by dividing each ωij by the sum of 
each row i.  A limitation of the binary joins matrix is that it assumes equal weights across all 
bordering spatial neighbors and does not allow the effective capture of spatial distances across 
all cross-sectional units.  Thus, we also consider various measures of spatial distance (d) that 
have been discussed in the literature (Bodson and Peters, 1975; Dubin, 1988; Garrett and 
Marsh, 2002; Hernandez, 2003), including inverse distance where ωij =1/dij , inverse distance 
squared, and exponential distance decay where ωij = exp(-dij).  As the distance between states i 
and j increases (decreases), ωij decreases (increases), thus giving less (more) spatial weight to 
the state pair when i≠j.  In all cases, ωij = 0 for i=j.  We follow Hernandez (2003) in using the 
distance between state population centers as our measure of distance.
20 
We found the inverse distance measure to outperform the alternatives based on the 
maximum likelihood principle and, hence, we report model estimates based on this measure.  
                                                      
19 See Anselin (1988, page 59). 
20  We use the geographic coordinates for the population centroids computed by the Bureau of the Census for the 
year 2000.  Population centroids did not differ significantly in early decades.  They also appear to reasonably 
approximate most state financial centers. 
  12For comparison, we also report one specification based on the more common binary joins 
weights matrix.  Further, we test whether the influence of spatial dependence varies across the 
nine Census regions.  Regional differences in bank regulation patterns, as well as differences in 
state land areas, suggest that the coefficients on spatial terms could differ across regions.
21  
Allowing for regional spatial correlation coefficients gives the following structure: 
(3a)           yW y X kk
k
R





      
where 










1 ()  
Here R denotes the total number of regions (nine), and ρk and λk denote the spatial lag 
and spatial error lag coefficients, respectively, for region k. Wk remains the (TN×TN) block 
diagonal matrix having (N×N) spatial weights matrix wk along T block diagonal elements.  
Now, however, we construct the elements of each matrix wk to capture spatial correlation 
between each state in region k and the remaining 47 states.
22  Thus, for each state i in region k,  
row i of wk  contains some measure of distance between state i and all remaining 47 states.  If 
state i is not in region k, then row i of wk contains all zeros.  In essence, we construct each 
matrix wk  by pre-multiplying each wk by a dummy variable that has a value of ‘1’ if state i is in 
region k, and a ‘0’ otherwise. 
  Rewriting the full spatial autoregressive model and incorporating the structure in (3a) 
and (3b) gives 
                                                      
21 The regions are: New England, Mid-Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South 
Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific. 
22 Note that this specification allows for asymmetry in spatial correlation between two states each located in a 
different region.  That is, if states i and j are in different regions, then the spatial effect of i on j could be different 
than the spatial effect of j on i. 

























The above structure induces heteroskedasticity (Case, 1992).
23  The covariance matrix is 












[ ' ] [ () ' () ' () () εε σ ρ λ λ ρ υ =− − × − −






2 is the common variance of the υit’s and 















  We correct for heteroskedasticity using the method of Case (1992) and Marsh et al. 
(2000).  We premultiply the full spatial model in (4) by the variance normalizing transformation 
Z = (diag(E[ε ε’]))
-½ .  The transformed model is: 























   Because y
* > 0 is the same as the event y > 0, we set y = 1 if y
* > 0, indicating that the 
state has adopted a liberal branching (or interstate banking) regime, or y = 0 if the state does not 
permit intrastate branching (or interstate banking).  The log-likelihood function for the spatial 
probit model is then expressed as 
(7)                       ln { ln [ ] ( )ln( [ ])}






it it =+ − −
= = ∑ ∑
1 1
11 ββ  
where XZ I W X kk
* ( =⋅− Σ ) ρ .  Setting either all ρk = 0 or all λk = 0 allows estimation of the 
spatial error lag or spatial lag model, respectively, and setting all ρk and λk to zero gives the 
standard probit log-likelihood. 
                                                      
23  Our model makes the assumption that the off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix are zero. Relaxing this 
assumption, while potentially increasing efficiency, greatly complicates the estimation procedure. Research has 
explored several alternative methods for estimating the spatial probit models that use information in the off-
diagonal elements (see Anselin, 2002, and Fleming, forthcoming).  However, the literature has not established a 
consistently reliable estimation technique.  We also assume that the error structure is not subject to temporal 
  14IV.  Estimation Results and Discussion 
We estimate various specifications of the spatial probit model using both the binary 
spatial weights matrix and the inverse distance spatial weights matrix described above.
 24  We 
report the results for models of intrastate branching and interstate banking regime choice in 
Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
  
For comparison, we report estimates of a non-spatial probit model (λ = ρ = 0) in the first 
column of each table.  We find that including spatial lag and/or spatial error terms significantly 
enhances the explanatory power of the model and affects the magnitude and significance of the 
coefficient estimates of some of the independent variables.  Based on likelihood ratio tests, we 
found that the spatial lag model consistently outperformed the spatial error lag model.  Hence, 
we report estimates of the basic spatial lag model, which assumes that the coefficients on the 
spatial term are equal across all regions, in the second and third columns of each table.  We use 
the binary joins weights matrix in the estimation reported in column 2, and the inverse distance 
weights matrix in the estimation reported in column 3.  The specification reported in column 4 
allows the coefficients on the spatial lag term to vary across regions and is estimated using the 
inverse distance weights matrix.  That specification also includes a spatial error term (λ) and 
generates the best fit of all the models we estimated.  
[Table 3 about here] 
[Table 4 about here] 
                                                                                                                                                                         
autocorrelation. To our knowledge there is established framework to correct for autocorrelation in a spatial panel 
probit model. 
24  We estimated several other models, but do not present them here for sake of brevity and clarity in presentation.  
Several specifications that permitted regional differences in the spatial lag coefficients dominated specifications 
that assumed no such differences, regardless of whether a spatial error term was included or not.  Also, we 
estimated a spatial error model using both the binary and distance weighting matrix.  The results from these models 
will gladly be provided upon request.  The log-likelihoods from these alternative models were significantly lower 
than for the spatial lag models presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
  15We find strong evidence of spatial dependence and spatial autocorrelation in our models 
of regime choice.  Regardless of which weights matrix we use, the estimate of ρ is statistically 
significant at α = 0.01.  As expected, all estimates of ρ are positive, which is consistent with the 
hypothesis that a state is more likely to deregulate if nearby states have also chosen to 
deregulate.  Except models (2) and (3) in Table 4, the log-likelihood is larger for the inverse 
distance weights matrix specifications compared to the binary weights matrix specification.
25  
The economic significance of the various estimates of ρ are quite reasonable.  From 
column (2) in Table 3, the probability that a state will permit intrastate branching increases by 
8.9 percent at the mean value of Wy
* (0.519).  From the distance weights matrix specification in 
column (3) of Table 3, the probability that a state will permit intrastate branching increases by 
7.4 percent at the mean value of Wy
* (0.041).  Considering the estimates for ρ in Table 4, 
similar computations reveal increases of 3.1 percent (column 2) and 2.6 percent (column 3) at 
the mean values of Wy
*, respectively.  Interestingly, the spatial lag effects are larger for the 
binary matrix, on average, then for the distance weights matrix, suggesting that direct neighbors 
had the greatest influence on a state’s regime choice.   Furthermore, the impact of spatial 
dependence appears to have been larger for the choice of intrastate branching regime than for 
the interstate banking regime. 
When we estimate individual spatial lag coefficients for each Census region, we find 
that all of the regional coefficients are positive and statistically significant in the intrastate 
branching model (Column 4, Table 3), and all but one of the coefficients is significant in the 
interstate banking model (Column 4, Table 4).  Although we find that spatial dependence was 
important throughout the country, we reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal in 
                                                      
25 This is not surprising because the binary matrix assumes that only contiguous states are influential on a state’s 
regime choice, whereas the inverse distance matrix assumes that all states have some influence, albeit decreasing 
  16several instances.  There are several reasons why the impact of spatial dependence might vary 
across regions, including differences in the prevalence of regional banking compacts, other 
aspects of banking market structure, and regional differences in average state size.  Tables 5 and 
6 contain p-values for pair wise equality tests of all ρκ for the intrastate branching and interstate 
banking models, respectively.  
[Table 5 about here] 
[Table 6 about here] 
Other Determinants of Intrastate Branching Regime 
In addition to supporting our hypothesis of spatial dependence in the choice of banking 
regimes, our estimates reveal several differences in the size and significance of the coefficients 
on other independent variables between the spatial and non-spatial models.     
One difference concerns the influence of a state’s small business sector on its choice of 
branching regime.  The non-spatial probit model estimates indicate that a 1 percentage point 
increase in the small firm ratio increases the probability of adopting a liberal branching regime 
by 2.6 percent.  The coefficient on the small firm variable is much smaller and not statistically 
significant when spatial dependence is controlled for, however, regardless of which weights 
matrix is used.  This casts doubt on the hypothesis that pressure from small business interests 
had an important effect on the choice of state branching regulations.
26 
A second difference between the spatial and non-spatial models concerns the influence 
of the relative financial strength of small and large banks on the choice of regime.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                         
with distance.   
26   Our results are not directly comparable to those of Kroszner and Strahan (1999) because of their use of a non-
spatial hazard model, differences in our specifications (e.g., we include per capita income as an independent 
variable and use different political variables), and because our sample period, 1970-97, differs from theirs.  
However, we reestimated our models over their 1970-92 sample period and obtained results that are qualitatively 
similar to our original estimates. 
  17coefficient estimate on the relative capital ratios of small versus large banks is positive in our 
non-spatial probit model, suggesting a 1 percentage point increase raises the probability of 
adopting intrastate branching by slightly more than 1 percent.  However, from model (4) in 
Table 3, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in the bank capital ratio results in a 2 percent 
decrease in the probability of adopting intrastate branching.  Finally, both our spatial and non-
spatial model estimates reveal that a larger share of banking assets in small banks reduced the 
probability of adopting intrastate branching, although the coefficient estimate is lower for the 
non-spatial model.  States were more willing to protect local banking markets from the 
competitive effects of intrastate branching when their small banks were relatively strong 
financially or held relatively large shares of state banking assets.  Our results are thus consistent 
with Kroszner and Strahan (1999), who find evidence that deregulation occurred later when 
states had relatively large or strong small banks, and with Abrams and Settle (1993) and Kane 
(1996), who argue that geographic restrictions on banks reflected the relative strength of small, 
non-branching banks. 
Both our spatial and non-spatial models also indicate that the probability of adopting a 
liberal branching regime was lower, the larger the share of a state’s combined banking and 
insurance assets held by insurance companies.  The coefficient on this variable is, however, 
much smaller in the spatial models.  The coefficient on per capita income is also different 
between the non-spatial and spatial models.  Specifically, a $1,000 dollar increase in per capita 
income increased the probability of adopting intrastate branching by 3.7 percent in the non-
spatial model but by just 1 percent in the spatial model shown in column (4) of Table 3.   
Finally, the coefficients on our political variables are broadly similar across our spatial and non-
spatial models, though only in the last two specifications do we find evidence that control of a 
  18state’s legislature by the Democratic Party reduced the probability of adopting intrastate 
branching. 
Other Determinants of Interstate Banking Regime 
With regard to the choice of interstate banking regime, we again find that several 
variables with statistically significant coefficients in the non-spatial probit model are not 
significant or are much smaller in the spatial lag models.
 27  As with intrastate branching, once 
spatial dependence is accounted for, we find no support for the hypothesis that the size of a 
state’s small business sector affected the choice of interstate banking regime.  Other variables 
that have significant coefficients in the basic probit but insignificant coefficients in the spatial 
lag probit models include insurance sector size and the difference between small and large bank 
capital ratios.  By contrast, the coefficient on small bank asset share is significant only in the 
spatial lag model, which supports the hypothesis that the probability of adopting interstate 
banking was lower the larger the share of state banking assets held by small banks.   
V.  Summary and Conclusions 
Scholars have long noted regional patterns in bank regulation, market structure and 
performance.  Recently, researchers have exploited the differences in bank regulation at the 
state level to study the effects of banking policies on economic growth (e.g., Jayaratne and 
Strahan, 1996; Freeman, 2002), and have considered the effects of banking industry 
consolidation on the cost and availability of credit to small firms (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 
2002; Avery and Samolyk, 2004).  Other studies have sought to explain differences in bank 
regulation across states, particularly with regard to their choice of branching and interstate 
banking laws (e.g., Abrams and Settle, 1993; Kroszner and Strahan, 1999).   
                                                      
27   Kroszner and Strahan (1999) do not estimate a separate model for the deregulation of interstate banking. 
  19The present paper extends this literature by modeling spatial dependence in the choice of 
intrastate branching and interstate banking regimes.  Obvious regional patterns in bank 
regulation and the formation of regional banking compacts beginning in the 1970s suggest that 
states’ decisions to adopt particular regulatory regimes were influenced by the decisions made 
by neighboring states.  Our estimation results strongly indicate such dependence.  We find that 
proximity to states that had liberal branching or interstate banking laws increased the 
probability that a given state would also adopt liberal laws.   We find significant quantitative 
differences in the impact of spatial dependence across regions, however.   
Our study also provides new evidence on the importance of the political, interest group, 
and public benefit explanations of banking regulation.  We find strong support for the 
hypothesis that the probability of permitting either interstate banking or intrastate branching was 
lower the more of a state’s banking assets were held by small banks, or the stronger a state’s 
small banks were financially relative to large banks.  Our results are thus consistent with prior 
research that finds a strong association between the relative dominance of small banks within a 
state and the state’s choices of branching and interstate banking regimes.  Further, we find that 
the larger a state’s insurance industry was relative to its banking industry, the lower the 
probability that the state would adopt liberal branching or interstate banking regulations.  
However, contrary to previous work, we find no evidence that the size of a state’s small 
business sector influenced bank regulation once we control for spatial effects.  Similarly, 
controlling for spatial effects greatly reduces the estimated impacts of state per capita income 
and of whether banks are permitted to sell insurance.   
Although state branching and interstate banking regulations have now largely been 
supplanted by changes in federal law, states continue to set a variety of banking regulations, 
  20such as limits on market share.  Further, state governments remain heavily involved in 
regulating insurance and other financial services, and engage actively in various economic 
development policies.  The importance of spatial effects on the choice of interstate banking and 
intrastate branching regime from 1970 to 1997 suggests that such effects should be considered 
when investigating the determinants of other state economic policies. 
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Table 1 – Years When States First Permitted Intrastate Branching and Interstate Banking 
 
State  Intrastate Branching (Through Mergers 
and Acquisitions)  Full Interstate Banking Permitted 
Alabama 1981  1987 
Alaska <  1970  1982 
Arizona <  1970  1986 
Arkansas 1994  1989 
California <1970  1987 
Colorado 1991  1988 
Connecticut 1980  1983 
Delaware <  1970  1988 
District of Columbia  < 1970  1985 
Florida 1988  1985 
Georgia 1983  1985 
Hawaii 1986  ** 
Idaho <  1970 1985 
Illinois 1988  1986 
Indiana 1989  1986 
Iowa ** 1991 
Kansas 1987  1992 
Kentucky 1990  1984 
Louisiana 1988  1987 
Maine 1975  1978 
Maryland <  1970  1985 
Massachusetts 1984  1983 
Michigan 1987  1986 
Minnesota 1993  1986 
Mississippi 1986  1988 
Missouri 1990  1986 
Montana 1990  1993 
Nebraska 1985  1990 
Nevada <  1970  1985 
New Hampshire  1987  1987 
New Jersey  1977  1986 
New Mexico  1991  1989 
New York  1976  1982 
North Carolina  < 1970  1985 
North Dakota  1987  1991 
Ohio 1979 1985 
Oklahoma 1988  1987 
Oregon 1985  1986 
Pennsylvania 1982  1986 
Rhode Island  < 1970  1984 
South Carolina  < 1970  1986 
South Dakota  < 1970  1988 
Tennessee 1985  1985 
Texas 1988 1987 
Utah 1981 1984 
Vermont 1970  1988 
Virginia 1978  1985 
Washington 1985  1987 
West Virginia  1987  1988 
Wisconsin 1990  1987 
Wyoming 1988  1987 
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0.412 0.492  0  1 
 
Small Bank Asset Share 
 
0.089 0.050  0  0.210 
 
Small Firm Ratio 
 
0.880 0.053  0.790  2.740 
Small/Large Bank 
Capital Ratio  0.033  0.026 -0.060 0.150 
 
Insurance Sector Size 
 
0.154 0.215  0.050  0.780 
 
Federal Funds Rate 
 
7.556 3.089  3.020  16.380 
 
Per Capita Income 
 
18,807 3,951  9,432  34,097 
Bank Insurance Sales 
  0.362 0.481  0  1 
Variable definitions and data sources:   
 
The political control variables were obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the Untied States and The Book of States, various 
years.  Small Bank Asset Share is the proportion of total assets in banks with assets of less than the state median.   Small/Large 
Bank Capital Ratio is the aggregate equity/asset ratio of small banks minus the aggregate equity/asset ratio of large banks in a 
state, where small and large are defined in terms of median bank assets.  Data on bank assets and capital ratios were obtained 
from Reports of Income and Condition (“Call Reports”).  Small Firm Ratio is the proportion of firms in a state with less than 20 
employees.  Data on firms were obtained from the Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns, various years.  Insurance 
Sector Size is the ratio of total insurance assets in a state to the sum of insurance and banking assets.  Information on the size of 
the insurance sector was obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Rand Institute.  Bank Insurance Sales is 
an indicator variable set equal to “1” for states that permit banks to sell insurance, and to “0” otherwise.  Information on 
insurance sales was obtained from Conference of State Bank Supervisors, A Profile of State Chartered Banking, and individual 
state banking departments.  Federal Funds Rate is the annual average market federal funds interest rate, obtained from the 
Federal Reserve.  Data on state Per Capita Income were obtained from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
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No Spatial Effects 
ρ = λ = 0 
(2) 
Binary Weights Matrix 








λ, regional ρ’s 























































-1.942*** (0.457)  -1.931*** (0.334) 



































λ -------  -------  -------  -2.913***  (0.870) 
 
ρ New England ------- -------  -------  1.068***  (0.209) 
        
ρ Mid-Atlantic ------- -------  -------  3.458***  (0.448) 
        
ρ  East North Central -------  -------  -------  2.483***  (0.443) 
        
ρ West North Central -------  -------  -------  1.010***  (0.181) 
        
ρ South Atlantic ------- -------  -------  0.812***  (0.159) 
        
ρ East South Central 
 
------- -------  -------  2.174***  (0.492) 
ρ West South Central -------  -------  -------  2.265***  (0.385) 
        
ρ Mountain 
 
------- -------  -------  1.906***  (0.310) 
ρ Pacific -------  -------  -------  7.058***  (1.261) 
        






Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Dependent variable has a value of ‘1’ if state i in 
year t had deregulated intrastate branching, and a value of ‘0’ otherwise.  Sample period is 1970 to 1997.  N=1,344. 
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No Spatial Effects 








λ = 0, ρ 
(4) 
Distance Weights Matrix 
λ, regional ρ’s 
Constant 0.987  (0.604) 
 
-0.378 (0.313)  0.012 (0.156) 
 
    0.074 (0.127) 
Legislature – D  0.032 (0.023) 
 
0.031 (0.030)  -0.004 (0.025) 
 
0.002 (0.014) 
Legislature – R  -0.005 (0.026) 
 
-0.025 (0.045)  0.007 (0.032) 
 
-0.004 (0.016) 
Governor – D  -0.206* (0.108) 
 
0.522* (0.307)  0.062 (0.144) 
 
0.023 (0.085) 
Governor – R  -0.222** (0.109) 
 
0.559* (0.316)  0.062 (0.139) 
 
0.028 (0.084) 
Small bank asset share  0.280 (0.221) 
 
-1.929** (0.866)  -1.558*** (0.382) 
 
-0.999*** (0.325) 
Small firm ratio  -1.404** (0.633) 
 
-0.136 (0.165)  -0.104 (0.108) 
 
-0.113 (0.098) 




0.252 (0.265)  -0.465 (0.292) 
 
-0.048 (0.170) 
Insurance sector size  -0.688*** (0.079) 
 
0.051 (0.039)  -0.004 (0.034) 
 
0.010 (0.023) 
Federal Funds Rate  -0.045*** (0.003) 
 
-0.001* (0.0007)  -0.001*** (0.0005) 
 
-0.001*** (0.0003) 
Per Capita Income  0.049*** (0.003) 
 
0.005** (0.002)  0.010*** (0.002) 
 
0.005*** (0.001) 
Bank Insurance Sales  0.045**(0.018) 
 
0.047*** (0.016)  -0.051** (0.025) 
 
-0.033** (0.015) 





------- -------  -0.923***  (0.291) 
ρ New England  ------- ------- -------  0.316**  (0.139) 
       
ρ Mid-Atlantic  ------- ------- -------  0.551*  (0.289) 
       
ρ  East North Central  ------- ------- -------  1.530**  (0.700) 
       
ρ West North Central  ------- ------- -------  0.331*  (0.169) 
       
ρ South Atlantic ------- ------- -------  0.404**  (0.204) 
       
ρ East South Central 
 
------- ------- ------- 0.782  (0.500) 
ρ West South Central  ------- ------- -------  1.044*  (0.551) 
       
ρ Mountain 
 
------- ------- -------  0.673**  (0.299) 
ρ Pacific  ------- ------- -------  4.050***  (1.533) 








Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable has a value of ‘1’ if state 
i in year t had deregulated interstate banking, and a value of ‘0’ otherwise.  Sample period is 1970 to 1997.  N=1,344.   
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0.001  0.168 ------- 0.001 0.000 0.629 0.681 0.238 0.000 
West north 
central  0.817  0.000 0.001 ------- 0.374 0.018 0.001 0.007 0.000 
South 












0.004 0.060 0.681  0.001 0.000 0.882 ------- 0.436 0.000 
Mountain  




0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ------- 
Note:  p-values are from joint significance t-tests on regional spatial coefficients from Table 3, column (4). N=1,344.  Bold values for pairs 
significantly different at 10 percent or better. 
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0.125 0.275 ------- 0.149 0.178 0.462 0.641 0.329 0.103 
West north 
central  0.861 0.212 0.149 ------- 0.451 0.301 0.092 0.016 0.005 
South 












0.096  0.269 0.641 0.092  0.137 0.694 ------- 0.390 0.036 
Mountain  




0.004 0.008 0.103  0.005 0.006 0.019 0.036 0.016 ------- 
Note:  p-values are from joint significance t-tests on regional spatial coefficients from Table 4, column (4). N=1,344.  Bold values for pairs 
significantly different at 10 percent or better. 
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